

Pricing Strategies for Viral Marketing on Social Networks

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


Motivation

Social Network Monetization


- Current monetization model:
 - Advertising
 - Leaves huge gap between potential and current revenue
 - Facebook:
 - 2007 valuation – \$15 billion
 - 2008 revenue (estimated) – \$300 million
- Proposed scheme:
 - Sell products through personal recommendations
 - Incentivize users to participate using cashback
 - Leverages network structure through trust on friends!

Viral Marketing

Model

- Seller marketing a product on a social network 
- Each new buyer: 
 - recommends the product to her friends
 - is promised a cashback for each friend that purchases the product
- Seller chooses price for each recommendation
- Each receiver: 
 - buys the product with probability as a function of price
 - is more likely to buy a product if more friends recommend it

Sample Scenario



Results

Problem Objective


- Find seller strategies that optimize expected revenue
 - Seller strategy – choose prices for potential buyers
 - Why expected? – people buy probabilistically
 - Assume that we start with a single initial buyer (seed)

Seller Strategies

- Two types of strategies are possible:
 - Adaptive: choice of price for a receiver depends on history of choices
 - Non-adaptive: prices are fixed before the process even starts!
- **Theorem:** Finding optimal non-adaptive seller strategies is NP-hard.
- Adaptive strategies can be strictly better, but computational hardness unknown

Algorithm

- Max-Leaf strategy:
 - Find the **Maximum Leaf Spanning Tree** for the network, rooted at **seed**
 - Give the product to the **interior nodes** for free
 - Charge some (optimal) price from the **leaves**



Theoretical Guarantee


- **Theorem:**
 $E[\text{revenue of Max-Leaf}] \geq c \times E[\text{revenue of optimal strategy}]$
- For some positive constant $c < 1$, where c depends on the probability model. This guarantee holds for very general probability functions.

Proof Sketch

1. Reduce social network to a graph with minimum degree 3
 - Need to ensure revenue from degree 1 and 2 nodes is constant
2. Find a max-leaf spanning tree on this reduced graph
 - This graph has a linear number of leaves
3. Optimal strategy can have at most linear revenue

Simulation on YouTube graph

- Comparison with random choice of prices
- Additional enhancement – locally improving pricing decisions



Conclusions

- Adaptive strategies do not offer a big advantage
- Simple **influence-and-exploit** non-adaptive strategies work well
- Trying to improve solution through **local search** may be beneficial in practice

Open Questions

- Incorporating cost of sending recommendations (spamming friends)
- What if buyers are non-myopic?
- Can we implement this on Facebook/Orkut?